I will go, I will go
The Battle for Mount Tumbledown

I will go, I will go  When the fighting is over To the land of Macleod That I left to be a soldier I will go, I will go When we landed on the shore And saw the foreign heather We Knew that some would fall And some would stay for ever When we came back to the glen Winter was turning Our goods lay on the snow And our houses were burning I will go, I will go "I will Go"  by the Scottish folk band The Corries. This song was the platoon song of Lieutenant Robert Lawrence MC              platoon, Scots Guards

With most of 5 Infantry Brigade entrenched in the Bluff Cove-Fitzroy area on 9th June, Brigadier Tony Wilson assembled the battalion commanders to plan the Brigade's part in the advance on Port Stanley. 3 Commando Brigade would attack Two Sisters and Mount Harriet, and 3 Para would take on Mount Longdon. 5 Brigade was assigned Mount Tumbledown, Mount William, Wireless Ridge and Sapper Hill. Wilson's first idea was for the Brigade to attack on the 12th June, with 2 Para attacking Wireless Ridge and the Ghurkhas undertaking active patrols on Mount Tumbledown and Mount William on the same night as 3 Commando attacked. The Scots Guards, with a company of Ghurkhas under command, would move in step with 3 Commando Brigade, covering their south flank. If Tumbledown and William did not fall to the Ghurkhas, the Scots Guards would go in at first light on 12th or 13th June. The Welsh Guards were down to only two effective companies and were intended to be kept in reserve by Brigadier Wilson.

A recce platoon of 2nd Btn, Scots Guards, was forward of Bluff Cove at a covert patrol base during the conference, and on his return, Lt-Col. Mike Scott recalled the platoon. Before it could withdraw they were brought under mortar and small arms fire.

Platoon Sergeant Allum gave the order to pull out, under intense fire, which wounded three men including Sergeant Allum. The casualties were taken to an emergency rendezvous and were lifted by helicopter direct to the main dressing station in Ajax Bay. The remainder of the platoon picked their way through a minefield that barred their retreat, the platoon then got a ride to Bluff Cove, courtesy of Scimitars and Scorpions of the Blues and Royals Troop, which was with 5 Brigade. The action showed that the Argentines were well prepared to face any threat from the south.

This made Lt-Col. Scott unhappy with a southern attack on Tumbledown and in a planning meeting with his company commanders, supporting battery commander, adjutant and ops and intelligence officers, they came to the conclusion that southern attack, in daylight across the harsh ground of Tumbledown's southern slope, would be suicidal. Scott went back to Wilson and with Wilson's agreement changed plans, to attack Tumbledown from the flank at night, using positions already secured by the Commandos to the west.

The new plan was once Tumbledown had been taken, the Ghurkhas would assault Mount Williams, and then the Welsh guards would pass through and seize Sapper Hill.

Scott issued his orders on the afternoon of 10th June. The attack would be silent and mounted in three phases, each based on a company attack, with companies passing through one another until the Mountain was secured. Supporting fire would be in the form of close air support from Harriers, five batteries of 105mm light guns, the mortars of 42 Commando and the Welsh guards. Naval gunfire support would come from HMS Active and HMS Yarmouth. A diversionary attack was planned to precede the main assault and draw Argentine attention to the direct they expected the assault to come from, the south.

The attacks were now scheduled on the night of 12th June, the Scots Guards were to be airlifted to their assembly area west of Goat Ridge at 0800 hours that day, but no helicopters arrived. When Lt-Col. Scott went to Brigade headquarters he found out about 3 Commando's successes of the previous night. In view of the delay, his attack would be delayed to the following night. However, he was able to take his company commanders forward, by helicopter, and give them a good look at Tumbledown form Goat Ridge.

The following morning the helicopters arrived and the men were airlifted into position. Sangars were dug and the Argentines shelled the position for most of the day, although they only wounded one man. The platoon and section commanders got a good look at the objective during the day and at 1400 hours, Scott gave his final orders.

The initial estimate placed Argentine strength at a company occupying Tumbledown, probably well dug in. The battalion would advance down Goat Ridge in a line-ahead formation by companies, with G Company leading, followed by 'Left Flank' and then 'Right Flank'. G Company would take the most western part of Tumbledown, which was thought to have one Argentine platoon on it. 'Left Flank' would then pass through to deal with the next part of the Mount, and finally 'Right Flank' would seize the remainder. H-Hour was fixed for 2100 hours. Each man was in light order, leaving his rucksack in the assembly area, but six sleeping bags per company were carried to help casualties. The assault would be made wearing berets; the helmet would be carried, as it was awkward for difficult terrain, and would be donned for the close assault.

The diversionary attack started at 2030 hours. Major Richard Bethell commanded the attack with three four-man assault sections from the recce platoon and a fire support group from Battalion headquarters with A1 echelon, the battalion's immediate logistics element. In support were the Blues and Royals and two sappers, a forward observation officer, and mortar fire controller.

Signs of the enemy had been seen earlier, but now none were apparent. Bethell sent the Blues and Royals off towards Stanley to draw fire, the lead vehicle running over a mine, but luckily not sustaining any injuries to the crew and without attracting the attention of the Argentines. A sangar was spotted as the assault group advanced. The fire support group took up position and the assault group closed in. They spotted further sangars and snoring could be heard. The group split up to deal with these dugouts and came under heavy fire. Two men were killed immediately and four more wounded. After two hours' hard fighting, the position was eventually secured and then came the withdrawal.

Major Bethell, and the piper with him, was providing covering fire for the withdrawal and both were wounded by grenade shrapnel. Four more men were badly wounded in a minefield. Argentine artillery opened fire. It had little effect as the shells buried themselves deep in the soft peat. The dead had to be abandoned and the party reached the starting point just after midnight, in time to see Tumbledown lit up by artillery fire and 0.5in tracers form Mount Harriet.

G Company advanced in two parallel columns for the three kilometres from the start line to their objective. Despite sporadic snow flurries, artillery, and mortar fire, as well as star shells, they managed to get onto their objective, only to find that the Argentines had abandoned it, but they heard Spanish being spoken further up the hill and remained undetected. The 'Left Flank' passed through G Company at 2230 hours and G Company provided supporting fire. This drew mortar and artillery fire onto their positions and they suffered some casualties. Meanwhile, the two platoons of 'Left Flank' closed with the enemy.

The right-hand platoon came under accurate artillery and machine gun fire and began to take casualties, while the left-hand platoon under Second Lieutenant James Stuart, had problems negotiating the rocks. His platoon sergeant, and one other man, was killed and two more were wounded including the company sergeant major. Both platoons tried to dislodge the enemy with mortar fire, grenades launchers, and light anti-tank weapons but the Argentines, regulars of the 5th Marine Battalion, would not budge. The FOO and MFC called down fire but had problems getting it to fall in the right place.

The Company Commander, Major John Kiszely, spoke to Battalion headquarters just before 0230 hours and informed them he was going to lead a charge. He led his men in a fixed bayonet charge, overrunning the sangars and killing the enemy in tough fighting. Major Kiszely, himself, had a lucky escape when an enemy round lodged in his belt. The move forward, guarding the prisoners, and clearing out the sangars, saw most of Major Kiszely's men absorbed and he found himself on top of the mountain with only six men, three of whom were wounded. Major Kiszely had some anxious moments, but the Argentines did not counter-attack. The attack had taken seven hours hard fighting and had cost 'Left Flank' seven men killed and 18 wounded.

The enemy were still holding onto the last part of the Mountain, and at 0600 hours 'Right Flank' moved to deal with them. Major Simon Price planned to do a right flanking action with two platoons, the third to provide covering fire. He had only half an hour until daylight. There was no artillery support and little mortar fire.

He attacked with the leading sections, firing their anti-tank LAWs as they went. Ricochets off the rocks flew in all directions and the enemy returned heavy fire. The Guards did manage to secure a forward position, and many acts of bravery were recorded. By 0800 hours, the objective was secured with several Argentines killed and 14 captured. 'Right Flank' had lost five wounded, including Lt. Robert Lawrence, who was awarded the MC.
 
 

Tumbledown was a very tough nut to crack and a remarkable achievement for a battalion that two and a half months before had been on ceremonial duties in London.