Planning

Hostages

We learned that 150 of the insurgents had withdrawn from Brunei City to Limbang, a small town about twenty miles further upriver. They had taken several hostages including the British Resident (a Senior Local Government officer) and his wife, a Catholic priest, and several  US Peace Corps Volunteers.  It was understood that the rebels had occupied the Residency and the Police Post and had made threats to the lives of the hostages. Clearly the hostages  had to be liberated and quickly. 

Planning

There was no road up to Limbang. Rivers are the principal means of communication in Borneo. We had no air cover or helicopters within easy reach.  A water borne dawn attack was the favoured option - a quick snatch-back before the rebels could harm the hostages.

The senior Royal Marine officers managed to do a sort of aerial reconnaissance of Limbang in a private aircraft belonging to the Shell Corporation. It gave them a slight update on the 1940’s maps but the rebels were wise enough to keep under cover when they heard the aircraft engines - so we did not know in advance the strength or disposition of the opposition.

Unlike the preparations for D-day, we had no Ordnance Survey maps and the Hydrographic charts did not extend that far upriver. Navigators will be familiar with the outline sketches that adorn the edges of some coastal charts with shading for high ground and the general shape of  rivers, but no depths or detail indicated. 

Captain Moutrie had a large wall-mounted map from which we made sketches, but bigger craft could not go upstream of Brunei city and the local boat traffic did not move after dark, so there were no buoys or navigation lights. There had been no recent survey, so no depths could be confirmed but Captain Moutrie had marked his preferred channel by placing spars on the main mudbanks  - which were prone to shift after the monsoon rains.

It was back to the techniques of Nelson’s navy when approaching an unknown shore. 

Our attack chart was a postcard-sized sketch with pilotage directions of the nature: 

“Take main channel out of lagoon for approx 8 miles. As river bears right, take second tributary on left. Limbang town is on the left bank of wide right hand bend. Residency and police post at far end of the town on a grassy slope, about 25 yards from the riverbank. Wooden jetty with boathouse opposite police post. Believed one fathom clearance alongside.” 

The vessels we commandeered had no log to judge speed and the (uncorrected) compass was of dubious value in the confined waters of the river. 

Resources and Tactics

We had pressed into service a number of small launches and two ferry craft. These were similar to Z-lighters, about 60 ft long and 12 ft beam, drawing about 3 ft, with engine and wheelhouse aft and a bow loading ramp. The Z-lighters were to constitute the raiding force with the launches as reserve.

One of the lighters was already loaded with two large, bright yellow caterpillar tracked earthmovers. We could not move them so they came with us. Hardly good camouflage, but in the event useful armour. “JCB Sangars” the Marine gunners called them but they had to explain the military jargon to us matelots … and we never did get the hang of dropping the bow ramp.

The main body of Marines who were to form the snatch squad were to go in the lead lighter and would make straight for the expected location of the hostages. The role of the second lighter, which carried two Vickers medium machine guns positioned between the JCBs, was to give covering fire. It also carried a reserve section of Marines to deal with any strong points in the town.

The primary objective was to liberate the hostages and transfer them to the safety of the lighters. Secondary objectives were to clear the town of rebels and, if possible, to obtain prisoners and further intelligence.

Given the risk to the hostages, it was judged inappropriate to put heavy gunfire directly into the buildings. The tactic was to rely on surprise and fast, aggressive action.

Force Organisation

The lead lighter was commanded by Lieutenant David Willis RN, First Lieutenant of Chawton, together with Captain Jeremy Moore RM and the main force of Royal Marines.

The “gunboat” was commanded by Lieutenant Peter Down RN, First Lieutenant of Fiskerton, together with Lieutenant Peter Waters RM. The crew of each lighter was a Midshipman, Coxswain, three or four seamen and a mechanical engineer.

Lieutenant Commander Black turned his cabin into a tactical HQ staffed by Lieutenant Peter Ford RN, Captain David Oakley RM and the indefatigable Captain Moutrie. Our radio communications staff became virtually “Watch on - Stop on” - a contribution which has not been sufficiently acknowledged.

This web site is maintained by