The Tragedy of 'Lucky Alphonse'
(The Paphos Fire)
By David Carter
This article was updated on 29/11/05.
Note: Some images can be clicked on for a larger version.


Click to Enlarge

More British soldiers died in a single day during Operation 'Lucky Alphonse' than in any other action conducted in the four-year-long EOKA conflict in Cyprus. The men were killed, not by terrorists, but by a fire that swept through the Paphos Forest at the speed of an express train and several 'friendly-fire' incidents. Even today the number of fatalities remains disputed and mystery surrounds the exact cause of the conflagration. But despite its disastrous finale, the operation virtually destroyed the terrorist gangs in the Troodos Mountains and could be considered by the 20,000 troops as a victory against Colonel George Grivas, the diminutive mastermind behind the Greek Cypriot campaign to oust the British from the island and unite it with Greece. Grivas himself barely escaped capture and was forced to hide in a small house in Limassol for almost the whole of the remainder of the 'war'. In spring 1956, British forces had Grivas on the run. Throughout May they had scored several successes, capturing many of the Colonel's most trusted associates and uncovering arms dumps. Almost daily the EOKA leader began receiving information that his terrorist gangs were being killed or captured. Some of these men, now faced with long prison terms or, worse, execution, eagerly became informers.

The picture on the right shows Grivas posing in the Troodos, This portrait, carefully backlit and staged, was issued by the Greek media to project a heroic image of the terrorist leader. Those who met him claim he dyed his moustache black to help disguise his age. Contrary to the image the terrorists projected in their propaganda, their bravado vanished the moment they raised their hands in surrender. They wanted nothing more than to please their captors and were enthusiastic to point out other EOKA activists, whether they were hiding in the hills or seeking shelter in nearby villages.

George Grivas Click to Enlarge

The finger-pointers, as they were known, only asked that they should be hooded when performing their Judas role. In return for their treachery, a few were rewarded financially and sent abroad with new identities. By early June, the authorities were confident of finding Grivas in his mountain lair and expected to bring the conflict to an end. Field Marshal Sir John Harding, the Governor of Cyprus, ordered Brigadier "Tubby" Butler of 16 Independent Parachute Brigade to plan and take tactical command of the largest military operation ever mounted in Cyprus. It was called 'Lucky Alphonse'.

The Parachute Regiment, the Royal Marines and the Gordon Highlanders, all stationed in the Troodos area, took the lead, supported by
The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry,
The South Staffordshire Regiment,
The Royal Norfolk Regiment,
The Royal Horse Guards,
The RAF Regiment
and a small landing party from HMS Diamond, which was on anti-smuggling patrol in the waters off Cyprus.
They were joined later by C Company of the 1st Battalion, the Highland Light Infantry.

"The area was thickly wooded and the mountain slopes fell away steeply, with many sheer drops among the rocky outcrops. It provided Grivas with opportunities to hide away in re-entrants, thick with scrub. The terrorists could almost have withstood an indefinite siege, even if located. Water was always available and villagers, whether they liked it or not, would provide them food."

The Paphos Forest Click to Enlarge

The Parachute Regiment entered the mountainous operational area around Kykko Monastery from the direction of Nicosia, while 40 Commando moved up the narrow, winding roads from their base in three-ton Bedford trucks.

Kykko Monastery Click to Enlarge

"Leading the convoy was a young subaltern in an Austin Champ, with a sergeant and two Marines," he says. "Suddenly we all had to stop. Ahead of us was a bridge with a large hole in the middle caused by an EOKA bomb explosion.  "The Champ was able to cross relatively easily, it's wheels balanced on the remains of the structure. But would the damaged bridge carry the weight of our Bedfords? There was only one thing to do." See what happened.

Kykko Bridge Click to Enlarge

 "Carrying our equipment, we all got off the vehicles. Then a Marine went ahead and waving his hands, carefully guided the first truck, inch by inch, to ensure its wheels remained aligned correctly on either side of the hole until the danger was over. Vehicle after vehicle followed the same procedure and all crossed safely, allowing us to embark again."

By the time the Marines left the bridge about 15 minutes later, the Champ had raced far ahead, its young officer eager to find out where his troops were to be deployed.  The convoy continued its way along a series of hairpin bends, until it rounded the final curve. There they saw the Champ lying upside down against the cliff face.  "The terrorists had planted a mine in the centre of the road on the blind side of the curve and detonated it when the lone Champ passed over, expecting the blast to throw the vehicle into the valley 600 feet below," explains Tarpey.

Hairpin bend in  the Troodos Click to Enlarge

"The force of the explosion, however, went in the wrong direction and the passengers became trapped underneath. It was fortunate for them because the Champ's body acted as protection when the terrorists started shooting from across the valley." To relieve the pressure, Grivas sent messengers to the town groups ordering them to create diversionary riots. He hoped many of the advancing troops would have to be withdrawn to deal with these, but to no avail.

1 Royal Norfolk Regiment at the start  of 'Lucky Alphonse'

The messengers had difficulty getting through the cordons and of those that did, many chose not to return.

The Colonel's only thought now was to find a way out of the cordon for himself and his men, but where were they to go? Whichever direction they chose to run, they saw more British soldiers or heard their movements. Nevertheless, somehow, they continued to evade their enemy by long marches, zigzagging their way along rough tracks and occasionally crossing roads at night.  "For the troops engaged in seeking out the terrorists, life was equally hard," a British Army officer recalls.

A rough track in the Troodos, the type used by Grivas

"Patrolling such country demanded huge resources of strength and determination while operating cordons or stop positions required immense concentration, especially when units were committed for several days running."

The work was painstaking and laborious. Every re-entrant was searched, every patch of scrub examined. Bren gun positions were set up to fire on fixed lines on every potential escape route so that they could be used at night. The chase was fast and deliberate. By now Grivas was running out of places to hide, but he still hoped to find a way out of the mountains and reach a 'safe house' in either Limassol or Larnaca by using a series of hides along the way. On 10 June, after a march lasting 17 hours, exhausted and short of supplies, he and his men reached a wooded valley where they decided to fill their water bottles and rest for a few hours in the shade of the trees. During the night they had narrowly escaped death when a patrol, consisting of a corporal and four soldiers, spotted his group 100 yards away on a mountain track. Instead of trailing the terrorists, the soldiers chose to get ahead and set an ambush. They slithered their way down a cliff and reached a deserted wayside chapel in the valley and waited. As soon as Grivas and his men came within range, the soldiers opened fire. The terrorists rushed back into the forest, but the soldiers lost them in the darkness.

(Grivas said later in his biography that he suspected there were British troops near the building because he had seen fresh footprints and an empty English cigarette pack. If this were true, it leaves open the question why he went forward in the first place and did not set up a counter ambush.

At about four o'clock in the afternoon, the patrol saw them and there was a brief exchange of fire, but the terrorists broke off the encounter. Grivas and five of his men fled into the woods without their personal belongings, including some weapons. According to Wally Dinsdale, one of the Paras, "These were spread out in a circle, as if the terrorists had just held a meeting".  The gang left behind Grivas' glasses, binoculars, a Sam Browne belt, boots and his meticulously kept diary, made up to 9 June. These would prove to be immensely valuable to the security forces.

The Paras Close on Grivas

An EOKA group photograph found among  the personal belongings

The diary, published later, gave an insight into the terrorist leader's mind. Although on the run, he continued to record every detail of his activity.

One entry showed he had authorised a 10 year-old boy to buy a new bicycle for losing his while running an errand for EOKA. He had also agreed payment of about £5 to another gang member for the expenses incurred from executing a 'traitor'. In the 1960s, Grivas recalled: "There was no attempt to pursue us or to make a thorough search of the immediate area, although several helicopters flew off in the direction of Nicosia - presumably to inform Harding of the incident. So we waited motionless and silent among the trees for two hours, wondering at the majestic clumsiness of the enemy… A British soldier was posted as a sentry, almost within touching distance of the tree I was standing behind."

Grivas diary page 3 Click to Enlarge

Two days after Grivas' narrow escape from the Paras, the Norfolks captured seven terrorists from the Paphos group. Two had £5,000 rewards on their heads. The men quickly revealed a hidden arms dump containing a Bren gun, three shotguns, two rifles and two sub-machine guns. But for every success for the troops, there was a tragedy.

On 14 June, a patrol from 3 Para heard movement in the forest ahead of them and opened fire. Unknown to the Paras, they were shooting at a stop-group from the Norfolk Regiment. In the encounter, Lance Corporal P. D. Elliot of the Norfolk's Support Company was fatally injured. Earlier in Operation 'Lucky Alphonse' on 10 June, 3 Para had shot dead WO2 J. Forster of 1 Para in an ambush because he had strayed over the boundary line between the two battalions. Private E. J. Brooks and Private I. R. Gurr also lost their lives. In the dense woodland navigation was never easy and led to these 'friendly fire' incidents.

Meanwhile, Grivas had split his men into two groups, each searching for a safe resting place. For two days, Grivas, with "Georghiades" and "Nikitas" rested outside Kaminaria village. On the evening of 12 June, the latter two approached the village again to acquire food supplies for the next lap of their journey, but British soldiers spotted them. They managed to escape unharmed and re-joined Grivas. Together they set off for Trooditissa, five miles away. Hungry and tired it took them the whole night and most of the morning of the following day to reach their destination, where they were fed by the abbot of the monastery. That night they slipped across the Troodos-Platres road and reached the southern slopes of the Troodos. After a short rest, they moved again under cover of darkness for Saitta. Waiting for them there was Hadjimiltis, the EOKA leader for Limassol district. He assured they would be made safe in the seaport, but he would have to make arrangements and these would not be completed until 18 June. They should head slowly towards Yerasa via Aghios Mamas, where they could rest again. In Yerasa, another EOKA contact would drive them to Limassol.

As the gang made their way, they avoided walking on roads and stayed in the open countryside, parallel to the routes used by Army traffic. However, some soldiers turned off the main road in search of a water point and almost literally bumped into their nemesis. Grivas decided to bluff his way out of trouble. He saluted the soldiers and walked by them with his men, all playing the role of peasants. They were waved on their way. When the soldiers rejoined their main body, they mentioned the friendliness of the locals. Hearing this, an officer questioned them carefully and came to the conclusion his men had let Grivas go free. Immediately the troops were ordered to focus their search in the direction the terrorists had gone.

Grivas and his men looked  like the shepherd above

Norfolks bury their dead Click to Enlarge

Elenitsa Seraphim, EOKA's female area commander, provides the terrorists' point of view in her published account of the conflict. She insists, "The fire was started deliberately by the British who were hoping to capture Dighenis and his men. The fire grew stronger as it advanced threateningly in the direction of Kykko and it went on raging the next day."

"Gales hampered the attempts of the men from the Forestry Department and the surrounding areas to extinguish the blaze and the situation began to look hopeless." "Our concern for Dighenis and the groups in the area was growing by the minute when suddenly, as if a divine hand wanted to stir up trouble, the wind changed direction and turned the flames towards the British soldiers. Now trapped by the raging fire they rushed frantically to escape, only to fall prey to the flames more quickly. Their vehicles were surrounded and turned into blazing brands."

Serafim and her gang Click to Enlarge

Jim Head and Libra Click to Enlarge

One of them, Jim Head, was an RASVC corporal attached to Z Troop, 45 Commando, whose OC was Major Halliday. They were usually based at Troodos, but were moved to Platres. They were ordered to patrol the Paphos Forest and break up the mountain gangs in the area as part of 'Lucky Alphonse'. With his trusted tracker dog 'Libra' at his side, Head saw the fire start. He says, "On Saturday, 16 June 1956, the Royal Marines started what was called 'prophylactic' firing of their 2 and 3-inch mortars, aimed at the horizon. They blasted away, then moved on to find another to hit.

"They began firing at 09.03 and continued until 10.23. Lt. Thompson, RM, took our patrol forward to find anyone who might have been 'flushed out'. To assist him I took my dog 'Libra' with me. I was carrying a small camera for personal use." Head managed to snap a picture before Thompson gave him a 'rollocking'. He continues, "Moving forward it became clear a fire had started. It did not come close to us, but we were ready to move out in a hurry if push came to shove. By nightfall, when I took my turn on guard duty, the forest was well alight.

Jim Head's photograph of the fire  soon after it started

The Fire Rages at Night

"At the end of the next day I wrote in my diary '13 Gordons dead. 25 trapped'. On the 18th, three Bedford trucks came through our 'camp'. They carried some of those who had lost their lives." "We all spent a very quiet day, keeping our thoughts to ourselves." Roy Baker, too, was with 45 Commando. He was serving as a signaller.

He tells me, "I was present when the fire started and heard an order given to the Royal Horse Guards to open mortar fire on caves in the mountainside. A faulty HT bomb was launched by mistake. That's how the conflagration begun. The trees were tinder dry and any spark would have set them ablaze. I ran like hell after our petrol drum went up like an atomic bomb, mushroom cloud as well."

Former Para Ken Jewsbury concurs that there was a large mortar barrage, but on a valley, while concentrated heavy machine gun fire raked the mountainside.

"One of these barrages started a fire in the valley floor, when a 'Curie', a type of whirlwind, plucked it up and carried it at the speed of an express train across the treetops on one side of the valley."

"The trees then fell as hot burning ash, leaving burning charcoal ash up to a depth of 12 inches in places. The forest floor was so hot it burnt the boots off our feet and the air was sucked from our lungs."

The author of the official history of the Royal Norfolk Regiment declares, "Whether or not mortar fire was the cause will never be confirmed, but it was at the time believed by some members of the battalion to have started the fire."

"We were firing away when suddenly we got the order. 'Cease firing! Christ! We've dropped a bomb on A Troop! Check ranges and bearings.' The radios were red hot. We were nearest to A Troop so we went to their aid. By the time we got there the medics had treated the wounded and there were four or five lads on stretchers. One sergeant of A Troop roundly cursed us and accused Support Troop of causing the accident," says Hughs.

"Our sergeant, Vic Pegler, was adamant we had not caused it. Whether a two-inch mortar bomb had hit an overhead branch or had exploded as it left the barrel... it was all speculation. Vic Pegler showed his upset by hurling a two-inch mortar on the ground and calling it an 'effing bastard toy', the only time I ever saw him lose his rag."

"We manhandled the stretchers up to the top of the mountain, where the casualties were picked up by helicopter and taken to hospital. We were left to pick up the unused bombs and dismantle the mortars and immediately noted that the bombs were well out of date. We also noted that the opposite hillside was alight. 'I suppose it will burn itself out,' someone said, but I was not sure. The following day the fire had spread and the operation began to collapse."

During 'Lucky Alphonse' Wallace commanded this platoon and was detailed to take his orders from a major of the Norfolk Regiment.

"On the night of 15/16 June I observed mortar fire on the side of a hill across the valley from my position," Wallace remembers. "I could see quite clearly the semi-circle of flames spreading from the points of the explosions."

"It is my opinion that the subsequent forest fire was a result of the mortar bomb explosions and was not deliberately started by EOKA as stories circulating later suggested." As the fire spread, Wallace was ordered back into the area to rendezvous with troops from the Gordons and Norfolks, under the command of a major from the Gordons, as part of a company to assist Turkish Cypriot foresters fight the fire. Former Para Wally Dinsdale adds, "I remember these people passing our location and they carried a blanket, which was their safeguard if they got cornered, as they'd wrap up and run through the oncoming fire."

Members 1 Royal Norfolks on  the move in the Troodos

At the RV, the foresters were very agitated and worried. When the major from the Gordons arrived, they told him the situation was becoming critical and they needed help to fight the fire.

The major replied that the foresters and Wallace's platoon should get to work immediately while he called for fresh troops to relieve the men who were there. "I took my platoon, with a group of foresters, up the hill away from the fire and began to create a firebreak near the crest, taking my directions from the foresters," says Wallace. He continues, "I had been promised fresh troops, but when they became long overdue, I went down to the original RV to confer with the major. He was not there and I did not see him again."

Wallace continued down the road away from the fire hoping to meet his relief and eventually met up with another group of foresters, accompanied by troops from the Norfolks and Gordons.

"They were standing by their three 3-ton trucks. The young officer in charge told me he had been given another task and was not our relief," Wallace recalls.

His account is one of the most graphic given me:

"By now the fire was closing on us and the foresters expressed their concern for our safety. Although events seemed to happen very fast, I remember clearly that I had time to walk back towards the RV, but was prevented by a wall of fire crossing the road in front of me. I was forced to return to the group I had just left. The foresters advised us that the situation had become critical and recommended we all follow them up the hill. Someone - I don't know whom - decided it was better to escape the inferno by using the trucks and he gave the troops an order to embark and move off."

One of many Land Rovers lost  during the operation.

"With my driver, I chose to follow the foresters' advice to abandon our Land Rover and headed up the hill. It is very hard to describe the heat. It was almost impossible to breathe and difficult to climb the hill. Near collapse and exhausted, an elder Turkish Cypriot forester saw my plight and helped me towards a burnt out patch of ground."

"I was left alone sitting there,, as the fire swept past me on both sides. Strangely, at no time, did I actually consider myself in danger. It was as if I were a spectator of events, safe in my little world."

"A forest fire is a spectacular and terrifying experience. It moves very fast, leaping from one spot to another in the blink of an eye.

"Suddenly I heard gunfire and screams coming from the direction the trucks had taken."

"A little later, through the smoke, I saw two men helping each other on the road. One of them was naked, his clothes burnt off him. By the time I reached the spot on the road where they had been, they were no longer there."

"I continued down the road, turned a bend and saw where the trucks had been caught in the blaze. It appeared as if they had driven straight into a tunnel of flames. The troops had tried to escape by running up an incline, but failed and their dead bodies were spread everywhere. Without dwelling on the horror of the sight and the effect of the fire, I now realised that the sound I had taken for gunfire was the soldiers' ammunition exploding in their bandoliers worn on their waists. The explosives had ripped out their guts."

"Suddenly, out of the smoke, a group of Norfolks with a senior NCO arrived. Together we began bringing the bodies to the road. There was no urgency, but it seemed the right thing to do."

"Despite the horror, the young soldiers were calm and carried out their distasteful task in almost a matter-of-fact manner with no signs of distress. Later we discovered the reason why these soldiers were unable to escape was because their Bedford trucks could not continue down the single-track road as they had been blocked by a scout car travelling in the opposite direction. Surprisingly the trucks and scout car, although hot and smouldering, were still capable of being driven."

"We pushed the scout car into a gully to try clearing the road. With hindsight, it was a pointless act."

"More troops arrived. With another officer now in charge, I went off to find my own platoon and driver. I had left them in the care of the foresters. Half a mile up the road, I found them sitting, 'having a smoke'. One of them casually remarked, 'We thought you were a goner, sir. We evacuated to another Marine location and next morning, rested, we drove back through the blackened forest towards Limassol."

Private Brian Sweeny of C Company of the 1st Battalion of the Highland Light Infantry was one of those sent to fight the fire. ‘Although 50 years have passed - and my memory is not as good as it was - I can never forget the ferocity of that fire,’ he says. ‘We were given machetes to cut a firebreak. Before long we were exhausted and received orders on our radio - an 88 set - that we were being relieved by another section and to return to the road below us.

‘Just as we got back up to the road, I was collared by our sergeant major and told to run back to the section that had just relieved us to warn them that the fire was about to encircle them. The lad who operated the 88 set hadn’t switched it on, and so they couldn’t be contacted. I got to the lads and we all made it back to the road safely, where I rejoined my section on a lorry. We drove a couple of miles to a refreshment point, but no sooner we were there than a Land Rover roared towards, the driver shouting for us to get the hell out. The fire was coming down that road as fast as he was. I’m certain it was travelling far faster than 30 mph.’

Sweeny recalls that Turkish Cypriot forestry workers had come out in force and were waiting, they said, for the wind to change before going into action. One of them told him he had learned his skills in Scotland!

An officer from The Royal Norfolks, who counted the dead, says, "Those who fled ahead of the fire perished, whereas those who ran at right angles to its path or even into the smouldering areas survived." Members of 3 Para supported the Norfolks' view when they recovered their dead. A vehicle carrying the 2/ic of A Company, Captain Mike Walsh, and Captain Michael Beagley, and their driver, Private Hawker, was caught in the flames. All three tried to escape by running downhill from the fire. Beagley and Walsh did not make it to safety. Hawker survived after falling into a ditch and staying there until the fire had passed. A covert OP was also caught in the path of the fire and the entire four-man crew perished, former Para Ken Jewsbury tells me. Another soldier, Jerry Bastin, remembers riding on the canopy of a 3-tonner as the Paras withdrew. "There were smouldering trees and bushes on either side. Some of us had buckets of water, which we used to damp down the canvas cover." Para Bryan Hunter and his men raced to a stream and lay down in the water until the fire had passed. "There was very little left of our kit when we got out and I hate to think what would have happened to us if the stream had not been there."

Smoke turned day to night  in the forest

"The chaps from 3 Para weren't consumed by the flames, the heat suffocated them. It was so intense that it had burnt all the oxygen out of the air. When we found their bodies they looked as if they were asleep." Roy Barker, Royal Marines, was among those given the task of recovering the dead. He says, "During the following days, we brought back bodies on stretchers in the back of our Austin Camps."

Others were carried in Bedford trucks. Despite the dangers, the RAF flew out several of the badly injured by helicopter to the British Military Hospital in Nicosia. Of all the regiments taking part in Operation 'Lucky Alphonse' none suffered more fatalities than 1 Gordon Highlanders.

The Battalion lost 2nd Lieutenant Bruce Kynoch, who had only been with the Battalion for three weeks, Lance Corporal Ferrie, and Privates Burnett, Cockie, Gerrard, William Gray, Ian Gray, Hindle, McRuvie and Simpson, all killed on the second day of the fire, June 17. During the subsequent four days, Private Dunbar, Lance Corporal Oakley and Private James Smith died from their wounds. More would have been killed had it not been for the bravery of Lt, Stanley Sutton of the Royal Army Medical Corps, who was the RMO, and W02 Leslie Dunn.

Paras return to their camps,  exhausted after the fire

He, with the other soldiers, then marched their way back to the wounded with the cans of water. Despite being badly hurt - and without any equipment - he nevertheless continued for the next five hours succouring the wounded. For his "brave conduct and devotion to duty was beyond praise", Lt. Sutton was made a Member of the British Empire (MBE). No less brave was WO2 Leslie Dunn. When the magnitude of the disaster was first realised, Dunn went out at once to investigate the situation. While waiting for assistance, he worked throughout the day, undeterred by the smoke and confusion caused by the fire. Dunn entered and re-entered the burning area, searching for survivors and organising the collection of the dead and injured. Ignoring the exploding ammunition that surrounded him, Dunn worked hard clearing the road of burning vehicles to clear the way for the convoy coming to evacuate his men. He was awarded the British Empire Medal for Distinguished Service and his "exceptional devotion to duty, courage and resource" that were "an inspiration to those about him". For "leadership and courage of high order", Captain R. Meadows, Royal Marines, was also made an MBE for organising rescues, carrying an injured man over a mile and moving a burning armoured car.

Grivas arrived in the small hours of the morning and was met by Dafnis Panayides, who had arranged a 'safe house'. The worst of the fire was over and Operation 'Lucky Alphonse', which had started with so much enthusiasm, was closing in a cloud of smoke and deep depression. Stupidity had caused the fire and once it took hold, the rescue operations were less than satisfactorily managed. Elenitsa Seraphim, the local EOKA area commander, has a different slant on the efforts to extinguish the fire and rescue survivors. She maintains, "Greek Cypriots tried to put it out the fire, rushing to help the soldiers and thus casting aside for a while the bitterness they felt towards their rulers who were spreading sorrow and grief throughout the island."

Elenitsa Seraphim photographed by  the police after her capture in 1956.

Seraphim continues, "The fire was brought under control and extinguished on June 19th after intensive efforts by local farmers. The government announced that 19 British soldiers had lost their lives and a further 18 sustained serious burns. One of our men who was on the wanted list, codenamed Kyros, had been trapped in the area surrounded by the army but he managed to escape before the fire started and reached Larnaca by bus. The next day I went to Nicosia and found a pleasant surprise awaiting me. It was a letter from Dighenis who was free again at last. What a relief. I said a prayer of thanks, as did all those of us who knew what he had been through."

Later there was a Court of Inquiry into the disaster. Captain A. W. C. Wallace, RM, was among those called to give evidence. Part of his testimony also contradicts Serahim.

"The Inquiry was unsatisfactory," he believes. "At one point, I was asked if the Turkish foresters had run away - deserted the British troops. I replied that on the contrary the Turks had given sound advice and repeatedly it had been ignored. I suggested that had their advice been followed and the urgency of the situation been appreciated, the tragedy may have been avoided. I do not recall any mention of this event after the Court of Inquiry."

The Inquiry's report was inconclusive. It stated there was no definitive evidence to prove whether the fire was started by EOKA to allow Grivas to escape nor that it had been caused by the pursuing British troops.

Paras search one of the EOKA hides found during the operation

Seventeen terrorists were captured during Operation 'Lucky Alphonse' and the EOKA mountain network was broken and no longer a major threat. Grivas was never able again to play the role of a combatant. From midsummer 1956 until 1959, he controlled the EOKA campaign from a basement in Limassol, only occasionally travelling in disguise to Nicosia to receive medical treatment, usually from his brother, a doctor.

Some of the EOKA arms collected.

Rumours that he eluded the British authorities by dressing as a woman during his excursions remain the stuff of legend alone. But Grivas considered Operation 'Lucky Alphonse' a major failure in military terms. "The difference between our strategy and that of the British was striking," he said later. "One can describe it by the following simile - one can only catch mice with cunning, and the means one must employ are cats and traps."

Grivas safe house Click to Enlarge

The British planners did neither. How many British troops died in the great Paphos fire during 'Lucky Alphonse' will probably never be known.

The dead of the fire were buried at Wayne’s Keep Military Cemetery in regimental groups with separate services by the chaplains of the different units.

The funeral service for the Parachute Regiment was delayed by half-an-hour, because a terrorist hurled a bomb at the funeral cortege not far from the American Consulate in Nicosia. It narrowly missed the Rev. Horace McClelland, the regiment’s chaplain. He was riding in an open vehicle at the head of the pro-cession, behind which was a truck carrying the bodies of two paratroopers.

The bomb exploded at the edge of the road, injuring three Greek Cypriotes who were passing on bicycles. There were no service casualties, however.

Escorting troops leaped from an armoured car, vaulted a wall and raced into a nearby garden, firing at the fleeing bomber, who escaped. The area was immediately cordoned off and houses searched. Four sus-pects were arrested later.

A British official condemned the attack, pointing out Rev. McClelland was wearing vestments and the bomber would have known he was a clergyman.

General Sir Charles Keightley, Commander-in-Chief of British Middle East Land Forces, attend-ed the services after flying over the fire-blackened ridges of the Troodos range.

“This is one of the grimmest disasters I have seen for many years," General Keightley said. “It was caused by a series of fantastically ill-fortuned circum-stances.

"These men died in a selfless effort to restore peace and remove murder, arson and intimida-tion from this island. Their lives were as much a sacrifice to the peace of the world as if they were killed in battle. The fact that they were re-establish-ing freedom from fear seems sometimes forgotten, both abroad and at home."

Long after the Emergency ended, Grivas continued to accuse the British of concealing the real number of fatalities and serious injuries. "The dead numbered more than 60," he said, basing his conclusion on information given him by Greek Cypriots on the ground and informants within the police. He denied seven terrorists also perished. A diary kept by a Royal Marine, however, gives a total of 19. The author of a Grivas biography, published in 1959 with the co-operation of the colonial authorities, confirms 19. Peter Herclerode, the author of 'Para', claims, on the other hand, that there were 30 fatalities. The number quoted by the Royal Norfolk's historian is 21. This tallies with the names published in the BSW Honor Roll.

There is an ironic postscript to this drama. Later in 1956 a representative of the Canadian Government arrived at Limini Camp to recruit for the Canadian Forest Service. "He wanted volunteers to become smoke-jumpers or airborne fire fighters," Bryan Hunter recalls. "Would you believe, he did not find a single applicant!"