Tiger Attack

Selected Operational Patrol Reports

The infantry, eventually, wins all wars and all battles.
Service in the infantry is both dangerous and arduous.
But the most honourable way of serving one's country. Field Marshall Slim.

The selection of these particular operational patrol reports does not reflect nor distract in any way from other jungle reports not selected. Therefore, I hope to give an overall impression of how these operations were implemented and executed within a jungle environmental framework, and in doing so, the reader may be able to understand this evaluation of the many deep penetration jungle patrols' stamina, frustration and professionalism that was the hallmark of those New Zealand infantrymen.

Let it be explained quite clearly, that for deep penetration patrols especially, there were strict guidelines laid down concerning the manner in which the Malayan aborigines were to be treated. Restraint of abusive language and violence within the confines of the village was high on the list of disciplines. However, the application and execution of the guidelines was occasionally neglected. Moreover, and it must be stated, that overall, the anomalies were being addressed. The main difficulty was in trying to establish and plainly distinguish between just whom the CT sympathisers were from those who weren't.

During Operation Boulder, in northern Malaya, Alpha and Charlie Companies of 1 Battalion NZ Regiment, supported by Charlie Squadron, Senoi Pra'ak(1), took over from a British contingent of the 22nd SAS, in the form of Bravo Squadron. This Squadron had previously killed one terrorist, and during the follow-up manoeuvre, they had located a CT camp with accommodation for eight personnel, including one female.

Bravo Squadron was primarily on a reconnaissance patrol within this area and their tactics were at variance with policy dealing with the aborigines(2).

Alpha and Charlie Companies adopted the line:
live-close-to-and-win-the-confidence-of the aborigines - especially around the Fort Legap region. One other aspect not clearly discerned was the varying temperaments, etc., between the different races and tribes of aborigines. A patrol moving into an unfamiliar area was not briefed on these finer points of aboriginal behaviour. Therefore, it was at the discretion of each patrol how to interpret the policy at any given situation. It would be fair to suggest, in the main, that negative reactions were at a minimum at this period.

The New Zealand patrols found the Temiar and the Negrito aborigines most cooperative. Once an aborigine befriended you, he would offer information without the need for prompting. Conversely, if harsh tactics, such as loud shouting, shoving and man-handling were implemented, the aborigine would, most decidedly, become obstinate, as they regarded such behaviour as intolerably insulting and would not cooperate under any of those circumstances.

(1) Senoi is a Temiar and Semai word that is a tribal classification used to differentiate from the other tribes. Pra'ak is a corruption of the Malay word 'perang,' or war. The British were, at first, hesitant at training the aborigines into soldiers.
However, the Senoi Pra'ak soon proved their mettle.
(2) Charlie Company, 1 NZ Regt. Notes on Charlie Company Tasks of Jaya 15-30 June 59. Contact and Incidents Reports, 1957-59. WA-M.

From 1953 the newly raised SAS began operating for lengthy periods in the jungles of Malaya. After a somewhat dubious start between 1951-53, the SAS learnt to make considerable profitable contact with the numerous and different ethnical aboriginal tribes. During 1955 and 56 the SAS in Malaya had five squadrons totalling 560 men, hard, well-trained men.

Colonel Frank Rennie led the New Zealand contingent to 22nd SAS.

However, keen to experiment, the SAS tried parachuting into the jungles. Although their efforts received extensive Press coverage, experience soon demonstrated that at least one serious injury would occur on each drop - an unacceptable risk, over a period of time. Therefore, this technique was quickly discarded before the culmination of the Emergency. It is now a proven fact, for whatever country is involved, all "Special Forces" including those of the United States of America; the orthodox units working alongside Special Forces view suspicion. The 22nd SAS was not alone with this difficulty.

Moreover, the Malayan orthodox units' heavily laden patrols of up to 14 personnel, spending up to three months duration on patrol, may not have achieved a dramatic number of "kills" - like, for example, the Ghurkhas. Nonetheless, indirectly, they were to exert an influence on the CTs even if it was only to ensure that the CTs moved elsewhere (sometimes into organised ambush layouts), thus disrupting settled supply lines and communication.

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