Index Sons of the Brave New Zealand's Contribution The Triple-Headed Banner The Kelantan Jungle An Over-Suppy of Ration Packs Panthera Tigris Corbetti Attack by the Man-Eater Return of the Tiger Newspaper Report Meeting with the Tiger Hunter Special Operational Reports Combined Operation A US Marine served in the Emergency! An Unenviable Job Further Tiger Victims Return the Malayan Index E-Mail Frank Britain's Small Wars

Combined Operation In April, 1959, an extremely large CT camp was discovered in deep jungle by one of 656 Squadron's Auster aircraft. This camp was located in the Betong Salient within Thailand, and was so large it could well have been Chin Peng's headquarters. At that phase of the Emergency the Commonwealth Forces were unable to legally cross the international border into Thailand to attack the CT stronghold. A special operation was forged, whereby a combined Malay and Thai Police Field Force would launch an attack while the 28th Commonwealth Brigade maintained a large network of ambushes on the Malay side of the border. A large contingent of personnel comprising Police, Special Branch, Army and Air Force, converged to monitor the operation and also, a high level of Army, Police and other personnel from Thailand was present. Another person of some importance in attendance from the State of Alor Star was John Davis. He was an officer from Force 136 who knew Chin Peng personally, therefore, he could presumably estimate Chin Peng's likely actions. His contribution was to play an important role in the operation. In this special combined operation were Numbers 2 and 9 Platoons, from 1 Battalion, New Zealand Regiment while 3 Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, provided 8 Platoon and the Assault Pioneer Platoon. Major R. Yetton, O.C. Alpha Company, 1NZ Regiment, was the officer commanding this ANZAC Force, but Captain A. T. A. Mataira, O.C. Delta Company, 1NZ Regiment, overtook command two days later. Before the start of the operation, Captain Mataira coordinated the platoons to set up a series of patrol ambushes on the border ridges. However, two days before the attack was to be launched, a patrol of 8 Platoon, 3RAR, ambushed an armed terrorist heading north, just south of the border. It was imperative that this CT's body be identified without any delay. Lt. Gordon's 9 Platoon carried the body away from the area of the CT camp so as not to compromise the operation. The body was wrapped in a poncho and tied to a sturdy branch, but, unfortunately, this cumbersome package kept snagging on vines and climbers as they descended the ridge, only to ascend yet another ridge some distance away.  Meanwhile, and according to Lt B.L.Redshaw, 2 i.c. Signals Platoon, 1NZ Regiment, he was flying in an Auster 9 that had proved troublesome on several recent occasions. On returning in falling light from a recce over 28th Brigade positions, he noticed that the right side of his body was getting wet with what appeared to be oil. (At that period, they flew the aircraft without any doors). On landing the aircraft it was discovered that it was, indeed, oil - leaking from an engine gasket. A suspected fault had already grounded all the Sycamore choppers and the one remaining Whirlwind was declared unserviceable. It was decided to parachute in a camera and fingerprint equipment to the waiting patrol - a mission that 656 Squadron detachment was chosen.

Lt Redshaw's reported account states the unreliable Auster 9 was tasked with this operation with Captain Nigel Budd, 10th Hussars, as pilot and himself as dispatcher. The equipment was to be dropped over a DZ near the waiting 9 Platoon. The load was parachuted which descended perfectly into the clearing. Then, to everyone's dismay, an up draught from the ridge lifted the parachute upward and sideways, depositing it into the top of a tall tree on the edge of the DZ. It was obvious that the patrol couldn't recover the parachute and another was likely to suffer the same consequence.

The Auster 9 returned to Kroh to collect further equipment, however, this time it was prepared for a free-fall drop with attached streamer. As this was thrown out of the aircraft, the pilot pulled the Auster tightly up and out. Redshaw, while watching the streamer, felt a bump and heard a loud thumping, ripping noise. Then he noticed the aircraft was flying very low, almost skimming the jungle canopy. The pilot called out and Redshaw saw that the aircraft had lost a sizeable piece of the port wing, with loose canvas flapping and two metres of a branch caught up on the wing. They had clipped the same tall tree on the ridge that had claimed the parachute!

On returning to Kroh they were surprised to be joined, firstly, by the 'grounded' Sycamore, then the 'unserviceable' Whirlwind and, finally, by an Otter aircraft. Meanwhile, the New Zealand patrol was sure they had crashed and had put up a 'Mayday' call. On landing, the aircraft was inspected and a metre of the port wing was found missing and also the fuselage was twisted out of alignment. The airframe was written off.

Lt K. M. Gordon's decided they should build an LZ to evacuate the terrorist's body to Security Forces' Special Branch. The whole area was primary jungle, with tree trunks being one to two metres in diameter. Even before the felling began, the platoon rigged bamboo platforms to get aloft of the huge buttress roots. Then axes and hand-powered chain saws were dropped into the area for the task.

Meanwhile, the terrorist's body, which had been hanging in a tree, had already started to decompose. The stench emanating was nauseating to all who came near it. A devastating blow was then dealt when it was found that as the chopper pilot started to descend, he radioed there was insufficient clearance for the chopper to land. There was, nevertheless, an aperture in the canopy and the men endeavoured to hoist the body as high as possible toward this. But, alas, the chopper in attempting to descend found it impossible to get low enough to hover.

The men became very frustrated in attempting to elevate the body even higher, but the task was beyond them. For one thing, the stench from the body was overwhelming at close quarters. Even so, the men exerted another attempt, but this, too, ended without success. The chopper departed. As one patrol member remarked, "This terrorist caused more trouble dead . . . than alive!"

The terrorist was buried right on the spot. Then the patrol returned back to base(1).

The attack on the CT camp was actioned two days later. Unfortunately, the CTs' sophisticated warning system alerted the camp and several Police Field Force were badly wounded in the action. Nevertheless, the camp proved to be a substantial headquarters of the Malayan Communist Party, and taking it out was a major step in the Malayan operation. It was not Chin Peng's headquarters after all.

The whole combined operation had been difficult and at the end the men were tired and worn. One dog handler was seen to be carrying his dog as the animal had cut both its paws deeply on sharp bamboo. The Commanding Officer, Captain A. T. A. Mataira was awarded an M.B.E. as a result of the operation.

An Alpha Company patrol decamped from its jungle base at 0530. After four hours' patrolling, they discovered a small, deserted terrorist camp and a quick search revealed fresh sets of tracks. Travelling through light jungle, they increased their pace for a full hour, and then dropped the pace sharply when the jungle became denser.

Within this heavily screened area the leading scout stopped abruptly, turned and relayed signals to his follow-up party. He had seen a basha. The patrol proceeded slowly, then they extended their search finding yet another terrorist basha. This camp had been sited quite cleverly for there wasn't any part of the camp clearly visible from more than four to five metres because of the dense foliage. In addition, even from the first hut no other basha was distinguishable.

Nevertheless, four bashas were discovered with each containing a bamboo-sleeping platform, table and chairs . . . ample accommodation for at least six personnel. In one basha three filled backpacks were found in a corner. Inside, two hessian sack packs contained large amounts of rice, 10 pairs of rubber-soled hockey boots with canvas uppers, a quantity of loose documents and 19 rounds of .45 ammunition. All the bashas were destroyed(2) but an extended search for fresh tracks was unfruitful. The search ended and the patrol returned to base.

(1) NZ Regt.Operational Report. Apr 59. Annex A to Monthly Report WA-M 1/1/23.
(2) Contact and Incident Reports, 1957-59. 1NZ Regt. National Archives, Wellington, NZ. WA-M.

The worth of good intelligence gathering being quickly executed is illustrated by this next report.

Information had been received that frequent food supplies were being manually transported via a special route. An ambush party was quickly dispersed and after a strenuous night's trekking the party was in position just before first light.

Even so, it was another hour before anything materialised. Then three aboriginal CT sympathisers, all carrying heavy loads entered the fringe of the ambush oblivious of danger. The leading aborigine was armed with a shotgun while the others carried Sten guns. The leading man was well ahead of his companions and the ambush party allowed him to pass unharmed. However, as the other two aborigines neared the centre of the ambush layout they abruptly halted and began to natter. The last aborigine suddenly broke off the conversation as something attracted his attention . . . He cocked his Sten gun as he slowly approached toward the ambush party. All the time he was furtively looking straight at the men concealed in the jungle. He stepped forward for a closer inspection and, as he approached, the leader of the ambush party immediately opened fire. The aborigine was killed instantly. At the commencement of firing, all the ambush party opened up with a barrage aimed at the other CT sympathiser. He, too, was killed instantly.

Meanwhile, the leading aborigine fled for his life along the track.

Items recovered from this successful melee were two Sten guns, three Sten magazines, 124 rounds of ammunition, nine pairs of rubber-soled hockey boots and a vast quantity of food(1).

Corporal R. A. Scadden, a Bravo Company patrol leader, decided to relocate his base site to a new area and ordered the patrol to decamp. It was 1530 when the patrol moved out and, initially, they followed along the bank of a stream heading east. The pristine jungle limited their visibility throughout and then the course of the stream dropped steeply. In amongst the deep bush, fresh tree cuttings were sighted and the patrol combed the area where, from a wider search, several newly made animal traps were discovered(2). The search continued and soon fresh foot imprints were found heading towards a nearby steep ridge.

Corporal Scadden ordered the men to remove their backpacks and put one man on guard. Then he directed the dog handler, Pte P. W. Paea, together with nine others to investigate further up the steep ridge. At the same time, the corporal sent one section along the base of the ridge.

Pte Paea led the 10-man section up the steep incline and was only a few minutes ahead of the second section when rifle fire broke out near by from the ridge above. Unbeknown to Pte Paea's section, a terrorist was well concealed in a trench, protected by a built-up breastwork further along the ridge. As the terrorist saw Pte Paea coming he hastily fired and missed. The return of fire from the 10-man section had such a startling impact on the sentry that he hurriedly fled back along the ridge without exchanging further fire.

Pte Paea's section spread out over a three and a-half metre area that somewhat hampered the manoeuvre. However, just then, intermittent firing broke out from the terrorist camp. The 10-man section pressed forward along the narrow ridge using spasmodic LMG (light machine gun) fire as cover.

They were completely unaware a terrorist camp was so close and their firing was answered with concentrated automatic fire. However, as the section moved forward and about 180 metres away from the sentry post, a gigantic tree suddenly confronted them with a trunk that was two and a-half metres wide. This shielded the camp beyond from all action directed against it. Pte Paea's section cautiously moved round the tree and was immediately met by flurried firing interspersed with tracer from an automatic weapon coming from the far end of the camp. This was answered with long bursts from their own LMGs directing fire back into the terrorists' camp.

Not one of the terrorists had been sighted throughout the whole encounter and during a further exchange of fire, the terrorists' suddenly decided to break off the engagement and executed a hurried withdrawal. The 10-man section swiftly followed after them and into the abandoned camp where they discovered a variety of documents and leaflets scattered about.

Cpl Scadden then joined Paea's men, still on the alert, with the remaining members of the patrol. The LMGs were quickly resupplied with ammunition and the n.c.o. organised a sweep through the camp to verify that the terrorists had, indeed, fled. Meanwhile, Scadden ordered a follow-up of the fleeing CTs and this section headed north and followed the fresh set of tracks left behind. The follow-up continued until darkness prevented further tracking and, although the search was continued the following morning, the tracks were eventually lost(1).

A considerable number of ruses had been adapted to elude the follow- up party, such as, attap leaves being placed over their tracks; doubling back; wading in streams - all used endeavouring to evade discovery. Evaluation at the time of the follow-up ate up precious time, which was to the desired advantage of the fleeing terrorists. In addition, the siting of this specific camp appeared extremely well planned. The steep ridge that housed the camp was only just over two metres wide, with the sides being almost sheer. Then, the giant tree had afforded extra protection against sudden attack, and the sentry in the well-camouflaged site gave advanced warning to the camp. The tree was later found to have been be peppered by an extraordinary amount of bullets. A large number of documents and equipment were recovered and the camp destroyed.

The patrol returned to base and afterwards, the men commended for their offensive action and coolness under fire.

(1) Contact and Incident Reports, 1957-59.1NZ Regt. National Archives, Wellington, NZ. WA-M.

An Alpha patrol set up an ambush in an area that consisted of numerous trees and scattered clumps of bamboo with good visibility still attainable. One section remained on a ridge that overlooked a track that led to an area covered by the second section. This second section, under the command of Lance/Corporal Percy Brown, included four Senoi Pra'ak [refer Footnote 1]. These aboriginal soldiers, had moved into an ambush position near a suspect terrorist basha(2), and as this section neared the basha area, Pte J. E. Davis, sighted two uniformed figures. As the figures approached closer, Davis alerted the Lance/Corporal, but Brown didn't immediately open fire as these figures were dressed in green uniforms similar to that worn by Senoi Pra'ak Squadron personnel. He wasn't sure the figures were terrorists, after all.

Pte Davis, however, was convinced they were, but Brown refused Davis permission to open fire. Brown then spoke to the Senoi Pra'ak members in Malay and asked if the men were from their Squadron. Meanwhile, Davis covered the two suspects who were busy talking. Unpredictably, the two suspects quickly separated and disappeared behind palm fronds and bamboo.

Cpl Brown, responded and assured of their identity, hunted to the front while the two Senoi Pra'ak protected the track. Brown and Davis covered each other as they steadily moved forward in short spurts. One of the Senoi Pra'ak men suddenly sighted a green uniformed figure behind some attap leaves and instantly called out to warn Brown.

Pte J. E. Barber also heard the warning and simultaneously sighted a uniformed terrorist and covered him. Nervously, the CT broke into a run. Then, suddenly, dropped down on his knees; arose and ran and dropped down again. As the terrorist dropped a second time, Pte Barber took a snap shot. But he missed.

Firing broke out between the patrol and the terrorists with the latter hurriedly retreating along the same route they had just used. The initial burst from the terrorists' fire killed Percy Brown(3). As he fell on the jungle path, Davis ran over and rolled Brown's body off and away from his Bren gun and quickly snatched it up and fired several long bursts after the fleeing CTs. The patrol followed-up, firing at suspect areas as they went, tensed at the possibility of walking into an ambush themselves. They continued the search, but when the Bren gun jammed, the patrol returned to the area where L/Cpl Brown had fallen.

Percy Brown was a very popular man within the Company and was sadly missed.

(1) Contact and Incident Reports, 1957-59. 1NZ Regt. National Archives, Wellington, NZ. WA-M.
(2) Ibid.
(3) In a newspaper report by Don Nightingale, headed "We had a Job to Do…and We Did it Well", he states and I quote…" During the fight, Percy sank to one knee. He was still in that position when it was over and we found he had been shot in the head…" This version is at variance with that as supplied by the Official Report.
›

The Intelligence Section passed on information that aborigines living east of the Cameron Highlands, near Fort Selim, had come forward with the location of the site of a newly established terrorist camp that was within their area of deep jungle.

Major A. N. King, Commanding Officer of Bravo Company, headed the assault party. This included Bravo Company's No. 4 Platoon with a section from No. 5 Platoon; the Commander of Fort Selim, Police Inspector Chapman with 12 aboriginal Home Guard who were armed with shotguns and, lastly, a 'hostile' aborigine Surrendered Enemy Personnel [SEP]. This SEP was one of the initial informants.
The patrol's progress was badly hampered by a time-consuming, frustrating aspect, which was that the SEP could only speak one aboriginal dialect that first had to be translated into Malay, and then re-translated into English. One other confusing drawback for Major King arose when the aboriginal names of several of the rivers differed with those on the section of the map for the area. The solution to pinpointing the approximate location of the terrorist camp was resolved by drawing river and stream systems of the area on the sand on a riverbank(1). Major King was neither impressed nor enthused with the situation - however, he was stuck with it.

The patrol proceeded at a good pace; nevertheless, the SEP displayed signs of heightened anxiety and became less willing and helpful as the patrol neared the target area. Then a rifle shot was heard nearby. A search revealed that mingled among footprints was a fresh trail of pig's blood, which came from the direction of a ridge.

The terrorist camp was sited on another steep ridge covered in heavy jungle over 1,100 metres above the river valley. The patrol was based where they were for the night with order banning smoking or cooking. Unfortunately, it rained heavily throughout the night and conditions became extremely cold and uncomfortable.

It was still raining heavily as the patrol silently decamped at first light. Five ambushes had already been placed into positions on the north side of the terrorist camp - some close enough to hear sounds of chopping and talking. Then, as Major King's Assault Section moved forward along a steep ridge towards the camp, rifle fire broke out from one of the ambush positions. From their position, Privates B. M. Toomey, B. W. Ford and D. G. Reid, together with two aboriginal Home Guard watched a lone terrorist as he approached their location. They let him pass through as their ambush site appeared secure and undetected. Nevertheless, the CT had only gone some 20 to 30 metres when he abruptly stopped, turned around, raised his carbine and fired two quick shots toward the ambush position. The ambush party immediately returned fire, certain that a hit had been made. Frantically, the terrorist dived over the ridge and disappeared as he rolled down the steep and heavily covered incline. The men followed-up with a search but failed to locate any signs of blood or of a casualty. Although a cotton cap and a U.S. carbine magazine were found and recovered.

At the same time, another ambush party from the patrol killed the terrorist Ah Yoong as he ran headlong out of the camp. Major King, realised the element of surprise was lost, but pushed ahead with the attack. The Assault Section slid down a jungle-encrusted slope to a narrow creek bed and then, painstakingly, climbed up the other side of the ridge and into the abandoned camp.

(1) Report on CT Contact by Major A.N. King, 30/6/58. Contact and Incident reports, 1957-59, 1NZ Regt. National Archives, Wellington, NZ. WA-M.

Four bashas discovered in the well-laid out camp were large enough for sixteen personnel. A thorough search of the surroundings failed to reveal any signs of either food or equipment(1) and, although the camp had been hurriedly evacuated, there was very little evidence left behind - a sign that this terrorist group was both well drilled and experienced. A follow-up was quickly mounted and seven men, under the leadership of Lance/Corporal P. Dillon, followed clear tracks of the main group that headed eastward away from the camp.

At the head of the patrol was Pte Brian J. Tuxworth, the dog handler, and then followed L/Cpl Dillon with the remainder of the patrol. Tuxworth's black Labrador 'Tammy' pulled vigorously on his lead and became most difficult to restrain throughout the rapid follow-up(2). They had been tracking for about 30 minutes when the conditions changed. The track narrowed then wound round the side of a ridge and as the dog handler manoeuvred along, he approached a large, fallen tree trunk. The next instant the terrorists opened fire, killing Pte Tuxworth in his tracks.

As soon as the shooting started, two other terrorist groups, positioned further along the track, also began firing with both light machinegun and automatic weapons. L/Cpl Dillon immediately moved into counter-ambush drill and returned fire on the terrorists. Then he directed fire of the other members of the patrol on to them. He then ordered the Bren group to move to his flank in an endeavour to cut off the terrorists' retreat and effectively organised covering fire to support this movement. However, during the manoeuvre the section came under constant and heavy counter-fire. The New Zealand section then launched an aggressive assault against the terrorists' superior ambush positions and the CTs immediately broke off the engagement and spontaneously withdrew over a ridge behind. The section followed-up, but no further action took place(3).

A .300 U.S. carbine was recovered near where the terrorist was killed. But more importantly, inside a pack also recovered, were several documents, one of which, covered five small pages written in cipher and tightly squeezed into 28 lines on each page. The document was later decoded by police Special Branch and declared as the most important find of the year. It contained a military appreciation of the terrorist organisation in the State of Perak.

During debriefing, it was said the CT ambushes had been both skilfully sited and well rehearsed(4) and the dead terrorist was officially identified as Ah Yoong, a personal bodyguard to Chan Hong, a State Committee member in Perak(5).

(1) Report on CT Contact by Major A. N. King, 30/6/58. Contact and Incident Reports, 1957-59. 1NZ Regt. National Archives, Wellington, NZ. WA-M.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid

Warrant Officer II P. R. K. Carrington was in command of a six-man patrol from Delta Company. The party was sent out to set up a night ambush position near a large area being cultivated mainly for vegetables adjacent to which was a large fishpond. With both the ambush site and placement of trip flares in readiness, the patrol kept the field workers under surveillance for most of the day. It was hot and humid in the ambush position but the day passed without incident. Vigilance was maintained throughout the night and, just after midnight, the trip flares were activated without warning. In the brightness of the flare, four uniformed CTs were illuminated. Three of them, by their indecisiveness, were instantly blinded by the sudden glare and they paid the ultimate price. Thus died Ah Chok, See Kwai and Cho Chan. The fourth CT, Lo Pak Yuen, was not affected as his comrades, for he managed to throw a hand grenade as he fled into the blackened surroundings of the jungle fringe.

Two of the ambush party leapt from concealment and chased after the terrorist who created a tremendous racket as he charged through the undergrowth. However, after a short distance he was captured. Upon their return to the ambush site, the grenade thrown by Lo Pak, which had failed to explode, was found during a search near the bodies. Also discovered were two carbines, two grenades and a quantity of ammunition. The patrol later came upon a terrorist camp nearby capable of supporting six personnel, complete with cooking facilities and medical supplies.

The Tracker Team was a special sub-unit within the 1st Battalion that comprised 25 New Zealand Servicemen, 23 Iban trackers from the Sarawak Rangers, three SEPs (who advised on terrorist tactics), a civilian liaison officer and 16 tracking and patrol dogs(1). The breeds of dog selected were both black and golden Labrador and German Alsatian. These dogs soon established a reputation second to none, and the dog handlers themselves, were handpicked for fitness and experience with dogs. The dogs were specifically trained not to attack, or bark, and were trained over a variety of conditions likely to be encountered during operations. Some of these animals were used as trackers, which followed scent along the ground; others were patrol dogs that worked in a similar fashion as sporting Pointers. The health of the dog was extremely important in its eagerness to work, for the greatest threat to these animals was the leech. A bite resulted in an open wound that wouldn't heal under jungle conditions and it was quite common for the dogs to become 'stale' after lengthy periods on patrol. In base camp, each handler had to wash, dip and groom his own dog, feed it and take it for three to four kilometre walks - night and morning. The handler and his dog soon became inseparable partners.
 

Within the unit was Lieutenant F. H. (Huia) Woods(2), who held the reputation as an expert in the art of jungle tracking in Malaya. He developed his own tracking techniques, which are still in use around the world. While serving in Malaya in the early 1950s with 22nd SAS New Zealand Squadron(3), Huia Woods participated in a jungle tracking competition against Australian aborigine, Ghurkha, Iban and Dyak trackers from Sarawak and Borneo and even the local Malayan aboriginal tribesmen who had the added advantage of competing in their own surroundings. Yet, the skills of Huia Woods surpassed them all. Later, his techniques in this art had wide-ranging connections.

The cunningness of the terrorists in attempting to conceal their tracks was revealed by one example.

"Three terrorists were walking along a jungle path superimposing their footprints on each other's imprint as they went. A fourth terrorist, carrying a long, pronged stick resembling a pig's hoof, walked carefully backwards impressing and superimposing the hoofmark over his comrades' footprints and then scattered leaves over the top as if in a natural position(5)."

Other interesting pointers later discovered were worm casts, which are excreted at night, will remain moist until the sun dries them out. Then they become hard and brittle. A crushed or broken cast gives a good indication as a time element from the time of its discovery. Sunlight and dry air also affect the sharpness of a print as the soil surrounding the imprint dries out, softens, and crumbles, leaving the edges of the imprint smooth. Rain can also mar the sharpness of a print although heavy, persistent rain completely wipes out most traces.

Lt Woods'skills in jungle tracking later led to an assignment in Vietnam, where he instructed U.S. troops. Huia Woods died in London in 1988 aged 56.

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