Memoirs of a Ground Liaison Officer
Introduction
I attended a Ground Liaison
Officers' Course at the School of Land Air Warfare at RAF Old Sarum, Wiltshire
at the end of 1954. Following this course, I was posted to Headquarters
No. 11 Fighter Group, RAF, Hillingdon as GSO2 (Liaison). My primary task
was to arrange Close Air Support for army formations on exercises in the
south of England. On reporting for duty, I was interviewed by the Chief
of Air Staff, a highly decorated veteran of the Battle of Britain. He made
it quite clear that the primary role of No. 11 Fighter group was the defence
of the UK against the Russian threat and I could have anything I liked
except aircraft for Close Air Support exercises for the army! This was
not a very promising start for a newly qualified GLO! In fact, it turned
out to be a blessing because it made me look round for alternative means
of providing Close Air Support for army exercises. Over time, I built a
very good relationship with Fleet Air Arm squadrons based ashore in the
UK. The primary role of the Fleet Air Arm was to support the Royal Navy
in their task of keeping the sea lanes open. Their secondary task was the
support of the army ashore in combined operations. I soon found that the
Fleet Air Arm took this task very seriously and were keen to take part
in army exercises. By the time the Suez Crisis blew up in the autumn of
1956, I had established an extensive 'old boy net' which turned out to
be most useful.
Mobilisation
In late August 1956, I was
recalled from leave and ordered to report RAF Old Sarum. On arrival, I
found that together with the other two GLOs based in the UK, we were to
be formed into three Air Control Teams and we were to be assigned to 2
(BR) Corps. The first job was to draw up stores and complete mobilisation
as quickly as possible. We had just about completed mobilisation when the
three GLOs were ordered to go to Malta to join 3 Cdo Bde to sort out their
Close Air Support problems and establish confidence in the system. In particular,
to get the ground-to-air communications working. I was told that the main
problem was the WS 201 VHF set used by the Forward Air Controllers to brief
the strike leaders. This was no surprise to us as we had all had trouble
with these sets on exercises in the UK. We had got them working properly
so I insisted that we should be allowed to take these sets complete with
batteries as accompanied baggage. Movement Control at Brise Norton were
adamant that we could not take them with us as the aircraft already had
a full load. I said we would not go without them. Stalemate! Eventually
Movement Control gave in and offloaded 3 men and their gear to make
room for our radios.
Training
The morning following our
arrival in Malta, we were up at sparrows for a Close Air Support Exercise
from 0500 to 1100 with the carrier squadrons. Our WS 201 worked and the
exercise went well. This went a long way towards establishing confidence
in the system. At 1400, we embarked in LST's for a full scale amphibious
assault exercise on the west coast of Malta. The three GLOs from the UK
found themselves in a new world! My Air Control Team landed with the second
wave shortly after first light. Unfortunately, our landing craft grounded
on a sandbar well short of the beach. My load included a 22 AH 12 Volt
Battery in addition to my own gear. As I was at the front end of the landing
craft, I was the first out and dropped into the deep water beyond the sand
bar. By the time the water reached my armpits, I was getting worried! However,
at that moment we touched bottom and got ashore safely. Once ashore, I
needed to establish my ACT where we could get a good view of the battle
field. A three-story building to my right front looked just right so I
led my troops at the double up the stairs to the roof top. Soon afterwards,
I became aware of a bit of a disturbance on the floors below. On investigation,
I found that we had invaded the Wrennery and caused considerable alarm!
For the first two hours, we were required to pass our Air Support Requests
through the HQ ship, HMS Meon on the Air Request Net. Communications
with HMS Meon on the Air Request Net did not work. After two hours,
HMS Meon withdrew from the exercise and the Carrier HMS Bulwark
took control of the Air Request Net. From there on, things went well. On
investigation, I found that control of the Air Request net was in the hands
of RAF operators using naval radios and army procedures. For the rest of
the work-up period, I put the R. Sigs Cpl from my Air Support Signals Tentacle
aboard HMS
Meon to sort out the Air Request Net. After this, the
Air Request Net was satisfactory. It was at about this time that I was
given another hat: GSO 2 (Liaison) on the G Staff of 3 Cdo Bde HQ. This
was very valuable as there was much to be done to refine air support procedures
in conjunction with the CB GLOs and Fleet Air Arm squadron commanders and
senior pilots. The weak link remained the JFSC on HMS Meon. Some
of the officers who would staff the JFSC in action were based in London
and did not take part in any of the work-up exercises in Malta. This was
to be the cause of a serious incident during the battle for Port Said.
The efficient use of the massive Close Air Support available to the assault troops demanded excellent communications and a sound knowledge of the procedures to be used. A key element was the 'Bomb Line'. This was a line on the ground beyond which the air forces had freedom to operate without reference to the ground forces. Targets on our side of the 'Bomb Line' could only be engaged by aircraft operating under the direct control of an ACT. The 'Bomb Line' was promulgated by the JFSC daily for the following day. The CB GLOs were responsible for ensuring that pilots were properly briefed regarding the location of the 'Bomb Line'.
Close Air Support Communications
Each Commando was provided
an Air Control Team (ACT) consisting of a GLO (army), and two Forward Air
Controllers , one RAF pilot and one French Airforce pilot. Each ACT had
a Tentacle from No 2 Air Support Signals Unit (R. Signals). The link
between the troops ashore and the Fleet Air Arm squadrons was the Air Request
Net. ( click here to view
Net Diagram) The ACTs were equipped with WS 201 VHF sets for ground-to-air
communications. These sets were not designed to be man portable and were
very difficult to manhandle ashore during assault landings. Eventually,
we acquired some two-wheeled trolleys that solved our mobility problems
until our transport caught up with us. In addition to our WS 201 ground-to-air
sets, each ACT had a WS 62 (Man Pack HF) set tuned to the Commando Command
Net. Each Tentacle had a WS 31 HF set on the Command net and a powerful
HF set on the Air Request Net. Click
here to view ACT Diagram
6th November. L Day.
Shortly after first light
on L Day, the Royal Navy bombarded the Port Said water front in preparation
for the landings. The assault troops were 40 Cdo, RM, on the left close
to the mole and 42 Cdo, RM, on the right. Just before we landed, we were
told that the beaches had not been cleared of mines. I remember we 'trod
lightly' until we were clear of the beach!
In fact, we were lucky. The beaches had not been mined. 40 Cdo made rapid progress against light resistance to start with. Early in the afternoon, X Troop was held up by a strong enemy position in Navy House and asked for an air strike to cover their assault. There was some delay in getting approval for this strike as the Navy were reluctant to see their old Canal Zone HQ destroyed. Eventually, we were allotted 8 Sea Hawks equipped with 56-lb rockets. The attack on Navy House from the air was a very tricky operation because the leading elements of X Troop were only about 80 yards from the north face of the building. The attack was skilfully controlled by Flt/Lt John Howe, RAF, and was a complete success. Following this strike, 40 Cdo cleared Navy House and consolidated their position.
This fierce battle resulted in about 30 Egyptians killed and 20 wounded. The use of Close Air Support in urban areas was difficult due to the proximity of our own troops to potential targets. This was the only Close Air Support operation carried out on the 40 Cdo sector that day.
Friendly Fire.
At 1600 hours, 45 Cdo, RM,
were landed by helicopters to the right of 42 Cdo with the task of linking
up with 3 Para at El Gamil. I had established an OP on the roof of the
police station on the west bank of the Canal. HQ 40 Cdo was in the same
building. From there my view to the west was blocked by tall buildings
but I could see the general area where 45 Cdo had landed. I saw a Wyvern
from 830 Squadron circling the area. I was listening on the Ground Attack
Common channel and heard a pilot report of the JFSC in HMS Meon
that he could see some troops and a couple of A/Tk guns and gave
a grid reference. As these troops were inside the 'Bomb Line', he asked
for permission to attack. By the time I got the position indicated by the
pilot plotted on my map, I could see that they must be 45 Cdo. In the mean
time the controller in
Meon had instructed the pilot to attack.
I tried to call up the aircraft on Ground Attack Common to abort the attack
but was unable to make contact. In fact, the target was HQ 45 Cdo, RM.
One Marine was killed and 15 people were wounded including the CO, Lt Colonel
Tailyor, and the GLO (Major Long). As this target was clearly inside the
'Bomb Line', it should not have been engaged without reference to the troops
on the ground. It was the duty of the controller in HMS Meon to
tell the pilot to contact the nearest ACT. In this case, No 3 ACT attached
to 45 Cdo or No 2 ACT attached to 42 Cdo. If there had been any difficulty
making contact on the Ground Attack Net, the controller could have made
contact via the Brigade Command Net or the Air Request Net. This tragedy
was entirely due to the fact that the controller had not taken part in
any of the work-up exercises and did not know the rules. The Wyvern pilot
was not to blame.
By the evening of 7th November, our forward troops had reached El Cap and were poised to break out from the Canal Zone and head for Cairo. The order to cease fire at 2345 hrs came as a shock and a bitter disappointment. In the days that followed, we had a very uncomfortable feeling that Port Said might be the number 1 target for a Soviet nuclear attack and we were sitting on ground zero!
Lt
Colonel (Ret) T.W. Whittaker, OBE
The
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